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The Hungarian parliament recently passed a new national security law that enables the inner circle of the
government to spy on people who hold important public offices. Under this law, many government officials must
“consent” to being observed in the most intrusive way (phones tapped, homes bugged, email read) for up to two full
months each year, except that they won’t know which 60 days they are under surveillance.
Perhaps they will imagine they are under surveillance all of the time. Perhaps that is the point. More than 20 years
after Hungary left the world captured in George Orwell’s novel 1984, the surveillance state is back.
Now, if the Fidesz government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán finds something it doesn’t like – and there’s no legal
limit to what it may find objectionable – those under surveillance can be fired. The people at the very top of the
government are largely exempt from surveillance – but this law hits their deputies, staffers and the whole of the
security services, some judges, prosecutors, diplomats, and military officers, as well as a number of “independent”
offices that Orbán’s administration is not supposed to control.
The Orwellian aspirations of governments are obviously not confined to Hungary. The disclosure of two giant data
collection programs carried out by the US National Security Agency shows that too many governments still aspire to
know too much about too many people. I’m already on record as a critic of the American warrantless wiretapping
programs, since I filed an amicus brief in Clapper v. Amnesty International, the case before the US Supreme Court
this term that attempted to challenge the program. The US Supreme Court refused to grant the plaintiffs standing so
the program has so far escaped judicial review. Many excellent legal analysts are writing about law underlying this
program so I won’t add to that in this post. For one particularly insightful and nonobvious take on the relevant law,
see here.
Of course, one of the many negative consequences of the American surveillance program is that other governments
will claim the right to follow in the US’s footsteps. But an overreaching surveillance regime in the US does not justify
a horrible copy elsewhere. I will concentrate in this post on the new Hungarian national security law, offered as a set
of amendments to the 1995 law on the same topic, amendments which passed shortly before the US surveillance
scandals broke.
Under Hungary’s new national security law, certain authorized government officials may initiate intrusive
surveillance on their higher-level underlings through asking for a surveillance order. Generating a surveillance order
doesn’t require that the target be suspected of doing anything illegal. Any old reason will do.
And who approves surveillance orders? No judicial warrants are needed. The only required approval comes from the
Minister of Justice, a feature which keeps control of the program within the inner circles of the government. (Readers
of my earlier posts may recall that this is the same person who has to approve much of the secret surveillance
carried out by the Counter-Terrorism Police, or TEK.)
How can surveillance lead to a person being fired? The national security law creates a new qualification for whole
series of jobs in the Hungarian government. All listed employees must now pass annual surveillance tests in order to
remain in their jobs. Now that the law has passed, potential targets of surveillance must sign a “consent” form. If the
targets have spouses, the spouses must sign consent forms, too. And if the targets or their spouses don’t consent to
this surveillance, the targets lose their jobs. In short, this “consent” is not optional and the whole family is fair game
for surveillance.
The primary goal of this program appears to be gathering “dirt” on particular people and holding this information
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against them when their superiors find it useful to do so. That may explain why the surveillance program collects the
content of all communications as well as the results of audio and video monitoring inside people’s homes, and the
information may be stored for 20 years. Though the program allegedly evaluates people for fitness to work, the
surveillance is not limited to what people do at work. Instead, it examines every detail of employees’ lives “with a
particular view to their behavior outside their employment, personal relationships, material or income status, or
relationship with a person who, to their knowledge, has been sentenced for a criminal offence.” So says the law.
There are no provisions for the redaction of irrelevant information, something that would be hard to do with no
definition of relevance in the law.
Who is now subjected to this surveillance requirement? Here’s the list:
Hungarian ambassadors and heads of consulates, anywhere in the world.
Judges and prosecutors who work either with information gathered through secret surveillance or with
information that might result in accepting a defendant’s cooperation with the government in exchange for not
being prosecuted (plea bargains).
State commissioners, who are people appointed on an ad hoc basis to manage specific high-level tasks in the
government.
Deputy state secretaries, who are people working directly under government ministers and their state
secretaries.
Heads of the autonomous and self-regulating government agencies, a designation that includes the public
procurement office, the office of economic competition, the equal treatment authority, the data protection
office, national media council, the financial supervisory authority and the energy and public utilities authority.
Heads of “government offices,” their deputies and people of equivalent rank, a designation that includes
regional offices of the central government, the central statistical office, national atomic energy agency,
national office of intellectual property and the national tax and tariff office.
Senior staff in the Parliament’s central office.
Senior staff in the office of the President of the Republic.
The chief of the army, generals and others with equivalent rank.
All heads of police departments (national, regional and local).
All heads of state-owned companies.
All employees of all of the security services, including the new Counter-Terrorism Police (TEK), the new
Parliamentary Guard, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (domestic intelligence), the Information
Office (foreign intelligence), the National Security Expert Service (signals intelligence), the Military National
Security Service, and the internal affairs unit of the police.
Since surveillance includes both sides of all communications, anyone who interacts with any of these people may
have their words and deeds captured for 20 years as well. If state employees on this list are found to be doing
something that the inner circle of the Fidesz government objects to, they can be classified as national security risks,
a classification which disqualifies them from their jobs.
The surveillance is carried out by the National Security Expert Service (NSES) which has the technical capacity to
wiretap, install bugs and intercept electronic communications. The law gives the Office for Constitutional Protection
(OCP) responsibility for assessing the information collected in the surveillance sweeps to determine whether
someone poses a danger to national security. Since all of the employees of both the NSES and the OCP can be put
under intrusive surveillance themselves for up to two months each year, this must make for some interesting office
politics.
When the OCP is finished with its assessment of each target of surveillance, it turns the results over to the official
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who ordered the surveillance and that official makes the decision about whether the target is to be blacklisted. But
the national security law provides no guidance either to the Office for Constitutional Protection or to the official who
makes the decision because it does not indicate what they should be looking for or what procedures they must
follow in making such determinations. Under the law, the targets of the surveillance have no right to appear at a
hearing, nor do they have an opportunity to explain or provide additional evidence before the fateful determination is
made. In fact, the targets won’t even know when they are under surveillance or when the results are being
assessed, so they can hardly insist on participating in a secret process. The law only says that the targets are to be
informed when they have been blacklisted and given the reason why they have been so classified. But that reason
may also be withheld from the target if the reason is classified as a state secret.
How may a state employee who has flunked the surveillance test get the assessment reconsidered? It depends on
which office the person occupies. In general, the official at the top of the employee’s workplace hierarchy can be
asked to review the judgment. So, for example, if a blacklisted employee works in the central office of the Parliament
or in the Parliamentary Guard, the Speaker of the Parliament can be asked to reconsider the classification; if the
blacklisted person works in the office of the President of the Republic, the President can be asked to reassess the
risk. The president of the National Judicial Office evaluates the blacklisted judges. The Chief Public Prosecutor
evaluates the blacklisted prosecutors. Anyone working for the security services can appeal up to the Interior Minister.
The Prime Minister himself is the judge of last resort for the rest: the heads of the autonomous and self-regulating
agencies, the heads of the government offices, diplomats, deputy state secretaries, state commissioners, military
personnel, heads of the police and owners of state-owned enterprises.
According to the law, decisions at this ministerial level are final and cannot be appealed to any court.
Once a person has been blacklisted, however, she will no longer be eligible for her job. This will lead to a termination
procedure through which the person is formally fired. But outcome of this procedure is not in doubt. The official who
presides over the firing process will only be able to reach one conclusion: the blacklisted person must be fired
because she no longer meets the qualifications for her job.
Any fired state employee can appeal her dismissal to a labor court. But since the decision to blacklist someone
cannot be second-guessed by the labor court judge either, there is not much that the court can do. Judicial review of
the procedure in these cases is very nearly meaningless.
Before someone moves into any of the positions that are flagged for the two-month surveillance each year, she must
go through a background check, an elaborate process that can be carried out for up to 45 days. In addition to the
jobs on the list above, government ministers, state secretaries and the members of Parliament who are on the
intelligence committees must also go through a background check before they take office, even though they cannot
be spied on again once they are in those jobs.
To begin the background check, the applicant fills in a questionnaire that requires, among other things, information
about the foreign contacts of both the would-be job holder and the spouse. This then triggers a thorough
investigation in which intelligence officers ask people for information about the target, gather information about the
target from communications and data storage systems (like phone companies and internet service providers), record
the person in public places, engage the target with secret informers, create fake organizations and documents to
make the target believe she is interacting with someone else and engage in the disturbing option of “creating traps
that do not cause physical harm.” (A direct quote from the law.) Of course, if someone flunks the background check,
then she doesn’t get the job in the first place.
Those specifically exempted from either the background checks or the intrusive surveillance include the President of
the Republic, the Prime Minister, Constitutional Court judges, the Speaker of the Parliament, the president of the
Supreme Court (Curia), the president of the National Judicial Office, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the ombudsman
and his deputies, the head of the data protection agency and members of the European Parliament.
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The Hungarian government argues that the new national security law protects state secrets and guards against
corruption. But the law doesn’t limit the surveillance to looking for evidence of leaked secrets or bribes. Instead,
anything that might be compromising seems to be in its remit. If the Hungarian government decides to fire a public
official for having an extra-marital affair or refuses to appoint a public official who is too friendly with the political
opposition, the national security law could provide cover.
Officials of the Hungarian government will say that what they are doing is nothing novel. Other countries, they will
point out, have ways to determine whether high-level officials have played fast and loose with state secrets or
whether people holding the public trust are corrupt. The US government has now been shown to be gathering up
everyone’s phone calls and emails, so how can anyone be critical of what the Hungarian government is doing?
I’m deeply critical of the US programs too, but the existence of the US programs should not give license for every
other government on earth to spy on people without any concrete suspicion. Given that the Hungarian surveillance
program involves listening to the content of phone conversations, reading emails and bugging the houses of state
officials to see what they are doing, there are particular dangers here. What is to prevent the Hungarian government
from simply blackmailing people with what they find? What keeps the Hungarian government from acting on purely
political information (firing someone for criticizing the government, for example)? The law contains no meaningful
protections against the use of the information for political and personal reasons and it offers no procedures that
would reliably correct mistakes.
European Union law requires that the collection of personal information about individuals be examined by an
independent data privacy officer who has the power to review government policies and actions in this area without
fear of political interference. At the moment, the European Court of Justice has before it an infringement action
brought by the European Commission that challenges the Hungarian government’s firing of the previous data
protection ombudsman, but the decision has not been announced. While the data privacy officer himself is on the list
of persons exempted in the national security law, his office is still on the list of those whom the Prime Minister can
put under surveillance. With this sort of legal ambiguity at the heart of the law, who is to oversee those who are
collecting all of this information and who is to guarantee that these surveillance checks are not abused?
When Orwell wrote his famous novel in 1949 about the all-seeing surveillance state, the Cold War was rapidly
closing in. Those on the eastern side of Europe were consigned to states in which personal privacy could never be
taken for granted. A country that had been through that experience might be expected to have a particular sensitivity
to what it means to turn citizens into spies against each other, especially a country whose leaders now pronounce
their anti-communist sympathies at every turn. But the current Hungarian government seems to have learned little
from its country’s recent past. Those who refuse to learn from the past are doomed to repeat it. In Hungary, it is now
approaching 1984 again.
This article was previously published on Paul Krugman’s blog and is reposted here with kind permission by the
author.
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